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  This paper reviews recent work on the implications of endogenous policy for the effects of 
trade on the environment and the sustainability of renewable resource stocks. A recognition 
that pollution policy is endogenous has had a major impact on the trade and environment lit-
erature and has reversed some of the previously established empirical findings. Work on pol-
lution has proceeded faster than work on renewable resources. I suggest some directions for 
future work in this area. 
 




The central question underlying much of the re-
cent work on trade and the environment is how 
globalization affects environmental quality and 
the sustainability of renewable resources. The 
work that attempts to answer this question can be 
divided into two very broad categories. One ap-
proach is to give answers contingent on the policy 
regime. For example, if agriculture is intensive in 
the use of pesticides, and if regulations restrict the 
amount of pesticide use per hectare of land, then 
if environmental policy is left unchanged, we 
might predict that trade liberalization that leads to 
an expansion of agriculture will increase water 
pollution because of increased pesticide use. An-
other approach is to treat the policy regime as 
endogenous. That is, the policy regime is treated 
as responsive to economic factors such as income 
and relative prices. Whether or not an expansion 
of agricultural output increased pollution would 
then depend on whether or not environmental 
regulations were tightened up in response to in-
creased pressure on the environment. 
  While predictions contingent on the policy re-
gime are useful and are crucial inputs in domestic 
policy analysis, there are many cases where ig-
noring the potential effects of globalization on     
the policy regime may be very misleading. For 
example, many common property resources in 
poorer countries are managed using traditional 
norms and mechanisms based on a stable social 
structure. If globalization disrupts these practices, 
then the management regime may collapse, lead-
ing to much more adverse environmental conse-
quences than might have been predicted based on 
the pre-trade management regime. In the context 
of transboundary or global pollution, attention to 
endogenous policy responses is critical because 
of concerns about leakage: the benefits of emis-
sion reductions by one group of countries may be 
undermined if other countries increase their emis-
sions in response. Endogeneity is also important 
in the empirical literature. If policy is endoge-
nous, then empirical work investigating the ef-
fects of environmental policy on trade and in-
vestment flows will give biased results if policy is 
treated as exogenous. Finally, and perhaps most 
obviously, concerns that trade liberalization may 
lead to a “race to the bottom” in environmental 
policy can be addressed only in a framework 
where policy is endogenous. 
  This paper reviews some recent work that ex-
plores the implications of endogenous policy re-
sponses for the effects of trade on the environ-
ment. The literature on endogenous policy re-
sponses in the context of pollution is much more 
extensive than that for renewable resources. I 
therefore begin by reviewing some of the recent 
work on pollution. I briefly discuss several ways 
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in which a focus on endogenous policy has led to 
new insights. Part of my objective here is to sug-
gest that the payoff to focusing on endogenous 
policy is high. I then look at some of the recent 
work on renewable resources, where there has to 
date been very little work on models with en-
dogenous policy. As this work is still very much 
in its formative stages, I focus in some depth on 
three different approaches to modeling endoge-
nous management regimes, and suggest some 
directions for future work in this area. 
 
Trade and Pollution 
A central theme underlying both policy debates 
and analytical work on trade and the environment 
has been the role of income effects in affecting 
both the demand for environmental quality and 
policy outcomes. 
  The pollution haven hypothesis proposes that 
trade liberalization will shift pollution-intensive 
production to low income countries because of 
their relatively weaker environmental policy. In 
the first wave of work on this issue, it simply was 
assumed that poor countries had weaker environ-
mental policy than rich countries (see for example 
Pethig 1976 and Chichilnisky 1994); however, 
subsequent work (Copeland and Taylor 1994, 
2003) studied models in which pollution haven 
effects emerged in models with endogenous pol-
icy—in these models, environmental managers in 
poorer countries choose relatively weaker envi-
ronmental regulations than do those in rich coun-
tries. 
  Income effects are also central to analysis of 
the environmental Kuznets curve—the relation 
between pollution and per capita income. One of 
the leading explanations for the improvement in 
environmental quality in rich countries is that 
environmental quality is a normal good, and so 
governments who are responsive to consumers 
regulate pollution more intensively in higher in-
come countries. 
  There is some evidence to support income ef-
fects. Dasgupta et al. (1995) develop an index of 
environmental policy and performance based on a 
survey of governments prepared for the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Devel-
opment. Their index is highly correlated with 
income, with high income countries having more 
effective policy. In a study of a specific pollut-
ant—lead content in gasoline—Hilton and Levin-
son (1998) found that the lead content was 
strongly inversely correlated with national per 
capita income, a result that they interpret as a 
reflection of policy differences across countries. 
Pargal and Wheeler (1996) in their study of Indo-
nesia find that the effectiveness of informal ap-
proaches in influencing environmental quality 
(such as community pressure) are positively cor-
related with income. This suggests that the in-
come effect need not rely on a formal government 
regulatory agency to be effective. Finally, there 
are a variety of micro-level studies, albeit mostly 
from high income countries, that suggest that the 
willingness to pay for environmental amenities is 
positively correlated with income (see for exam-
ple Kriström and Riera 1996 and Hokby and So-
derqvist 2003). 
  Income effects are important in the study of the 
effects of trade on the environment because the 
motivation for trade liberalization is usually to 
increase real income in a country. However, 
where there are income effects, there are typically 
substitution effects as well. And since trade liber-
alization changes relative prices, we should ex-
pect both income and substitution effects to play 
an important role in determining the respon-
siveness of environmental policy to trade liberali-
zation. Consequently, a model is needed to keep 
track of these different effects. 
  Two types of models of endogenous environ-
mental policy have dominated the literature on 
pollution and trade: representative agent models, 
and political economy models. These two ap-
proaches share a common thread, since in most 
political economy models, governments must 
weigh the general public interest against interest 
groups. Consequently, in both types of models, if 
environmental quality is a normal good, higher 
average per capita income typically leads to more 
stringent environmental policy. However, in po-
litical economy models, distribution and interest 
group effects may work against this effect. 
 
Income Effects and the Effect 
of Trade on the Environment 
To illustrate briefly how income effects influence 
the predicted effects of trade and the environ-
ment, consider a country that exports pollution-
intensive goods. Figure 1 illustrates the supply 
and demand for emissions. Emissions are on the  




Figure 1. Effect of Trade on Pollution for an 
Exporter of Pollution-Intensive Goods 
 
horizontal axis, and for simplicity I use a pollu-
tion tax on the vertical axis as a proxy for the 
stringency of environmental policy. The initial 
demand for emissions is D0. This is a derived 
demand, reflecting emission of pollution as a side 
effect of production. With a lower pollution tax 
(or implicit cost of emitting), the economy emits 
more pollution. The pollution supply curve cap-
tures the country’s willingness to allow emissions 
as reflected by the policy regime. Several supply 
curves are illustrated, corresponding to different 
policy regimes. 
  First, suppose there is a fixed pollution tax 
(similar results are obtained with a fixed emission 
intensity). The supply curve is then S0. Trade lib-
eralization will stimulate the export sector, and 
since it is pollution-intensive, this shifts out the 
demand for emissions. With a fixed emissions 
tax, emissions rise to z1. With fixed emissions 
taxes (or fixed emission intensities), the effects of 
trade on the environment can be estimated by 
predicting the effects of trade on outputs. 
  Next, suppose that the pollution supply curve is 
given by S1. In this case, the government tightens 
up policy as more pressure is placed on the 
environment. A trade-induced outward shift of 
pollution demand will still raise pollution to z2, 
but the endogenous policy response dampens the 
increase. 
  Finally, suppose that the pollution supply curve 
is income-responsive. Since environmental qual-
ity is a normal good, we expect the demand for 
environmental quality to rise with income. Since 
trade liberalization will typically increase per 
capita income, this suggests that the pollution 
supply curve will shift back and to the left if the 
policymaker is responsive to consumer prefer-
ences. The amount by which the supply curve 
shifts back depends on income and substitution 
effects. With a sufficiently strong income effect, 
the new supply curve will be S2, leading to a fall 
in pollution from trade liberalization despite the 
country having a comparative advantage in the 
dirty goods. 
  What is a strong income effect? In a simple 
model, Copeland and Taylor (2003) show that if 
the income elasticity of marginal damage is less 
than or equal to one, then the income effect is not 
strong enough to offset the increased demand for 
the right to pollute. Intuitively, if the income elas-
ticity of marginal damage is one, the policy re-
sponse exactly offsets the scale effects of eco-
nomic growth. That is, in this case neutral growth 
has no effect on pollution. However, trade liber-
alization is not neutral—it also changes the com-
position of a country’s production. For an ex-
porter of pollution-intensive goods, the composi-
tion effect tends to increase pollution. This addi-
tional composition effect over and above the in-
crease in the scale of production of the economy 
tends to increase pollution unless the income elas-
ticity of marginal damage is sufficiently large. 
  Overall, we see that both the quantitative and 
qualitative effect of trade liberalization on envi-
ronmental quality depend on the policy response. 
To determine the effects of trade on the environ-
ment we need to know not just the shift in pollu-
tion demand, but both the slope and shift in the 
pollution supply curve. 
 
Political Economy, Dampening 
Effects, and Tariff Substitution 
Suppose now that the government is responsive to 
interest group pressure. Then pollution policy will 
depend on factors such as how corrupt the 
government is, and how strong different interest 
groups are in the economy. One of the key 
questions that has been investigated with such 
models is how pollution policy responds to trade 
liberalization. 
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  One way to think about this is to consider that 
weak pollution policy is similar to a production 
subsidy. Consequently, if an import-competing 
sector loses trade protection, it will ask the gov-
ernment for other forms of protection; and a 
weakening of environmental policy is one way to 
achieve this. Bommer and Schulze (1999) use a 
political economy model to show that pollution 
policy becomes weaker when trade is liberalized 
if the import-competing sector is pollution-
intensive. This result is an example of tariff sub-
stitution. The idea is that trade agreements create 
incentives for governments to use domestic policy 
instruments to act as substitutes for trade barriers. 
Another implication of this line of work is that 
endogenous policy responses will dampen the 
effects of trade liberalization on both pollution 
and production patterns. 
  However, there is another possibility, as shown 
by Damania, Fredriksson, and List (2003). They 
use a Grossman-Helpman (1994) framework in 
which a corrupt government elicits bribes from 
producers to provide favorable policy. In their 
model, tariffs are exogenous, so polluting indus-
try bribes the government to provide weak envi-
ronmental policy. When trade is liberalized, the 
industry contracts and becomes less profitable. It 
is therefore less able to afford bribes, and so the 
government tightens up pollution policy. The 
predictions of this model are opposite those of the 
previous model. The difference is that trade pol-
icy is endogenous in the former and exogenous in 
the latter model. When trade policy is endoge-
nous, governments prefer to protect polluters with 
tariffs than with weak pollution policy because it 
imposes less cost on consumers (see Schleich 
1999 for a nice exposition of this point). Conse-
quently, a trade agreement that removes tariffs as 
a potential instrument from governments results 
in tariff substitution. However, if tariffs are ex-
ogenous, the only instrument available to gov-
ernments both before and after trade liberalization 
is the pollution policy (these models are restricted 
to two instruments), and so tariff substitution 
does not arise. 
  These are two competing hypotheses that could 
be tested empirically. So far there is very little 
evidence available, and that which we have is 
conflicting. Eliste and Fredriksson (2002) use data 
on trade liberalization in U.S. agriculture and find 
evidence of tariff substitution. Ederington and 
Minier (2003) use panel data on U.S. imports and 
find that industries with higher import levels are 
likely to have weaker environmental policy, a 
result which suggests that environmental policy is 
sensitive to foreign competition. However, Dama-
nia, Fredriksson, and List (2003) use a panel of 
data on the lead content of gasoline for 48 coun-
tries and find that openness tends to lead to more 
stringent environmental policy in more corrupt 
countries. This can be interpreted as evidence 
against tariff substitution. Given the conflicting 
results in this literature and its relevance to the 
debate on whether or not trade liberalization leads 
to a “race to the bottom” in environmental policy, 
there is potential to do much more research in this 
area. 
Income Effects and Comparative Advantage 
Income effects lead naturally to a theory of pollu-
tion havens. Consider two countries, North and 
South. Let X be a good that pollutes when it is 
produced, and Y be a clean good. The countries 
differ only in income—North is equiproportion-
ately more productive in both goods. Assume 
preferences over goods are identical and homo-
thetic, and separable from environmental quality. 
In Figure 2, I have drawn the relative demand for 
X. Because of homotheticity, the relative demand 
curve is the same for both countries. If there is no 
pollution policy, the relative supply curve is also 
the same for both countries. This is because the 
countries are identical except for neutral produc-
tivity differences—there is no comparative ad-
vantage by assumption. 
   
Figure 2. Pollution Haven with Endogenous 
Policy 
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  Now suppose there is endogenous pollution 
policy. Then, since North is richer than South 
because of its superior productivity, North will 
choose more stringent environmental policy than 
South. This raises relative costs in the polluting 
industry and implies that North’s relative supply 
curve will be up and to the left of South’s, as illus-
trated. In the absence of trade, North’s relative 
price of X will be higher than South’s, implying 
that when trade is liberalized, North will have a 
comparative advantage in the clean good. South 
becomes a pollution haven—its weak environ-
mental policy attracts dirty good production away 
from North. 
Trade and the Convergence of Environmental 
Policy 
Another implication of endogenous environ-
mental policy is that the forces causing trade may 
not be picked up by empirical work using equilib-
rium environmental policies. 
  To illustrate, consider our simple North-South 
model. Suppose that North’s income is higher 
than South’s, but that the difference is not ex-
treme. Suppose that income is the only difference 
between countries and that initially trade barriers 
are high. Figure 3 illustrates the pollution supply 
and demand in each country. The initial pollution 
demands are D0 and D*0. North initially has a 
higher pollution tax than South (τ0 > τ∗0); this 
gives South a comparative advantage in the dirty 
good. When trade is liberalized, North imports 
the dirty good, causing its pollution demand 
curve to shift down to D1, lowering North’s pol-
lution tax. South exports the clean good, shifting 
out its pollution demand curve and raising its 
pollution tax.
1 Notice that by taking pressure off 
North’s environment and increasing pressure on 
South’s, trade creates a tendency for pollution 
regulation to converge. This is the standard factor 
price equalization result from international trade. 
Copeland and Taylor (1995) consider a North-
South model in which trade leads to complete 
equalization of the intensity of pollution regula-
tion across countries, even though the only mo-
tive for trade in the model is differences in pollu-
tion regulation! 
  Consider the simple case where the income 
elasticity of marginal damage is equal to one. 
This case is of interest, because it implies that 
neutral economic growth has no effect on pollu-
tion. In this case, Copeland and Taylor (1994) 
show that trade leads to an increase in pollution in 
South and a fall in pollution in North. That is, 
trade alters the incidence of pollution, shifting it 
towards poor countries. Moreover, note that trade 
shifts pollution-intensive production towards the 
country with the weakest environmental policy. 
One can show that this implies that trade can in-
crease world pollution, despite the fact that each 
country is fully internalizing externalities, and 
that there is no international externality. What is 
particularly striking about this example is that 
neutral economic growth has no effect on global 
pollution, but trade raises world pollution. 
  One can, however, turn this example around, 
by noting that trade is driven by more than just 
environmental policy. If the polluting good is also 
capital-intensive, and North is capital-abundant, 
then it is possible that North may export the pol-
luting good if its capital abundance is more im-
portant for production costs than is its more strin-
gent environmental policy. In this case, trade 
would shift the polluting good towards North, and 
lower world pollution. There have been relatively 
few attempts to carefully test these alternative hy-
potheses. Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor (2001) 
indirectly test this using data on sulfur dioxide 
pollution, and find that the evidence is consistent 
with the latter hypothesis—trade seems to reduce 
pollution because the richer countries appear to 
have a comparative advantage in sulfur-dioxide–
intensive production. However, there is no reason 
to expect that this result will be robust across other 
pollutants, and so more work needs to be done. 
  This result has important implications for em-
pirical work. In the example above, trade is 
driven by pollution haven effects, but in equilib-
rium, the data will not exhibit significant differ-
ences in environmental policy. Consequently, 
differences in environmental regulation may ap-
pear not to be a significant variable in affecting 
trade flows (even though they are in fact the only 
cause of trade flows in this example). The trade 
literature on the effects of factor supply differen-
tials on the pattern of trade deals with this issue 
by not using factor prices as the explanatory vari-
able for trade flows. Instead, measures of relative 
factor supplies are used. That is, to test the hy-
pothesis that labor-abundant countries export   
 
1 For simplicity, I have not drawn the shift in supply curves—both 
are likely to shift up because of the increase in real income induced by 
trade. 
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Figure 3. Trade Leads to Convergence of Pollution Policy 
 
labor-intensive goods, data on relative supplies of 
labor is used rather than data on wage differen-
tials because it is understood that trade will alter 
these wage differentials. This is problematic for 
environmental economics, since there it is diffi-
cult to find an analogue to relative factor sup-
plies—it is the income differential that makes 
environmental services an expensive factor in the 
North. To date, there has been no empirical work 
that addresses this problem. 
 
Effects of Environmental Policy on Trade Flows 
The endogeneity of environmental policy can be 
critically important in interpreting the effects of 
environmental policy on trade and investment 
flows for other reasons as well. To illustrate, sup-
pose that whether a country exports or imports 
polluting goods depends on an agglomeration 
effect (which we index by A) that affects produc-
tivity. High A means that, all else equal, the coun-
try is more productive in the polluting good. 
  Refer to Figure 4, which is based on Copeland 
and Taylor (2004a). Let two countries share a 
common supply curve S, but let country M be an 
importer of pollution-intensive goods (a low-A 
country) and let country E be an exporter (a high-
A country). The demands for emissions are illus-
trated, with country E’s demand to the right of 
country M’s. 
  Now consider the effects of pollution policy on 
trade flows. First note that for any given country, 
an exogenous increase in the pollution tax will 
cause firms to move up along their pollution de-
mand curves and reduce emissions. This raises 
production costs and lowers net exports (or raises 
imports). That is, our model predicts that an in-
crease in pollution taxes will reduce net exports 
(and it would also predict that the country is a 
less attractive place for foreign investment in pol-
lution-intensive industries). 
  However, when we compare countries, notice 
that the pollution tax is higher in country E than 
M. That is, in a simple naive regression, we 
would find that higher pollution taxes are corre-
lated with higher exports of pollution-intensive 
goods. The pollution tax in country E is high be-
cause there is high pressure on the environment. 
Success in exporting is causing stringent envi-
ronmental regulations. If this effect is not ac-
counted for, then the researcher may mistakenly 
conclude either that pollution regulation does not 
deter exports, or that it may actually promote 
them, perhaps via the Porter hypothesis. 
  Recent work suggests that this is important 
empirically. Much of the empirical work prior to 
1997 found no evidence that environmental pol-
icy affected plant location and trade flows (see 
Jaffee et al. 1995). However, virtually all of this 
work used cross-sectional data and was not able 
to control for unobserved heterogeneity, nor was 
there much effort directed towards explicitly 
dealing with policy endogeneity. More recent 
work using panel data has been able to control for  
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Figure 4. Exogenous vs. Endogenous Policy 
 
unobserved heterogeneity and has focused on 
endogeneity issues. That work has found that 
environmental regulation does affect trade flows 
(Levinson 1999, Levinson and Taylor 2004), 
plant location (Becker and Henderson 2000, 
Greenstone 2002, List et al. 2003), and inward 
foreign direct investment into U.S. states (Keller 
and Levinson 2002).
2 One weakness of this work 
is that it is based entirely on U.S. data. However, 
it suggests that taking the endogeneity of environ-
mental policy seriously is critically important in 
interpreting the empirical evidence. 
 
Empirical Evidence on Openness 
and Environmental Quality 
Endogeneity of policy may also lead to misinter-
pretations of the data linking increased openness 
to environmental quality. Suppose there are two 
types of governments: good and bad.
3 Good gov-
ernments have good policy, and suppose this 
means that they have both lower trade barriers 
and more stringent pollution regulation. Figure 5 
illustrates a case where both B and G are export-
ers of pollution-intensive goods. B has a low pol-
lution tax and G has a high one. And suppose that 
both pollution taxes are rigid and unresponsive to 
short-run changes in pressure on the environment. 
                                                                                    
2 See Copeland and Taylor (2004a) for an extensive discussion of 
this work. 
3 This example is discussed in Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor 
(2001). 
G has more liberal trade policies and so its pollut-
ing industry has higher emissions demand (D
G) 
than does country B (with D
B). 
 Notice  that  G is more open and has less pollu-
tion. In a regression of pollution on openness, one 
might conclude that more open economies are 
cleaner so that trade is good for the environment. 
However, this would be misleading. More open-
ness actually increases pollution in country G 
(because it shifts out the pollution demand curve). 
In this case, it is differences in the quality of gov-
ernment that is causing both openness and envi-
ronmental outcomes. Good government leads to 
both more open trade and a cleaner environment. 
However, controlling for government type, open-
ness may well worsen environmental quality. 
 
Global Environmental Issues 
As a final example of the ways in which a focus 
on endogenous policy is important in understand-
ing the effects of trade on pollution, I briefly dis-
cuss global pollution. Results contingent on the 
policy regime may be adequate if the purpose of 
analysis is to advise domestic policymakers (as-
suming that the domestic policymakers can con-
trol the policy regime). However, in many cases, 
one needs to predict the effects of changes in the 
world economy on foreign pollution. This is criti-
cal in cases where domestic agents care about 





Figure 5. Openness and Environmental Quality 
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  Consider global pollution and the Kyoto Proto-
col. Suppose there are two groups of countries—
those that agree to cut emissions, and those that 
do not. We denote these latter countries collec-
tively as “ROW” for “rest of world.” If the Kyoto 
countries reduce their emissions, this raises the 
price of pollution-intensive goods, causing ROW 
to increase its production of these goods, and thus 
increase its pollution. This is carbon leakage. 
  Suppose instead that pollution policy is en-
dogenous and that ROW exports polluting goods. 
Then the increased price of polluting goods in-
duced by the cut in emissions by the Kyoto coun-
tries improves ROW’s terms of trade and in-
creases its real income. If environmental quality 
is a normal good, this will lead to a tightening of 
environmental policy in ROW, and this tends to 
dampen and may possibly reverse the increase in 
pollution in ROW. That is, pollution in ROW 
may fall in response to a cut in emissions by the 
Kyoto countries: domestic and foreign emissions 
may be strategic complements when policy in the 




Trade and Renewable Resources 
 
In contrast to the literature on pollution, much 
less work has been done on the effects of trade on 
the sustainability of renewable resources. Most of 
that work has focused on two types of manage-
ment regimes: either fully optimal resource man-
agement or pure open access. Differences in the 
policy regime can have particularly dramatic im-
plications for the effects of trade on renewable 
resources. Consequently, the possibility that trade 
liberalization may lead to changes in the intensity 
of resource management is a potentially important 
issue, but one that has so far received relatively 
little attention in the literature. 
  To illustrate the contrast between the effects of 
trade under different management regimes, con-
sider the simple Brander and Taylor (1997) 
model,
5 with two sectors, manufacturing (M) and 
harvesting (H), one primary market-supplied fac-
tor (labor), and a resource stock S. Assume that 
for a given level of the resource stock S, there is 
 
4 See Copeland and Taylor (forthcoming) for more details. 
5 Chichilnisky (1994) also developed a model with similar predic-
tions. 
constant returns to scale in production. Then the 
short-run production frontier is linear, as illus-
trated by PPF0 in Figure 6. 
  First, consider the case where the resource is 
open access. Suppose that the economy is initially 
in a long-run steady state equilibrium at point E—
the initial domestic relative price of H is equal to 
the slope of the short-run production frontier. 
Finally, suppose that the country exports the har-
vest good in a free trade regime. 
  Now, consider the effects of a trade liberaliza-
tion that raises the relative price of H to p1. First, 
suppose that the resource is open access. Then 
there will initially be short-run gains from trade 
(utility rises from U0 to U1). However, as H in-
creases, the stock S is depleted, causing the short-
run production frontier to rotate inward toward 
PPF1. If the economy continues to produce both 
goods in the new steady state, the production 
frontier will continue to rotate inward until its 
slope is equal to that of the new world price 
(since that is the only frontier consistent with di-
versified production). Trade therefore leads to 
stock depletion and a decline in steady state real 
income. For a sufficiently low discount rate, dis-
counted real income must fall. 
  In contrast, if we have efficient resource man-
agement, then trade must raise discounted real 
income and will lead to stock depletion only if it  
is optimal to do so. In terms of Figure 6, the man-
ager could, for example, keep harvest rates at H0,  
 
 
Figure 6. Trade Liberalization in an Open 
Access Fishery 
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in which case the production frontier would not 
rotate inwards and the economy would reap con-
sumption gains from trade. Alternatively, the 
manager could initially allow some increased 
harvesting to take advantage of higher harvest 
prices, and then cut harvesting back once the 
stock reaches its new optimal steady state level. 
  This example illustrates how the consequences 
of weak resource management policy are poten-
tially much more damaging for an economy than 
in the case of pollution. Poor resource manage-
ment leads to both environmental devastation 
(stock depletion) and reductions in long-run in-
come. This decline in long-run income may re-
duce the demand for other types of environmental 
quality and can lead to the type of downward 
ecological spiral hypothesized by Daly (1993) in 
which trade leads to resource degradation, which 
leads to lower income, which leads to more re-
source degradation, and so on.
6 Moreover, low 
income people in developing countries tend to be 
more dependent on renewable resources than are 
high income people in those countries.
7 Con-
sequently, resource depletion may adversely af-
fect the distribution of income as well as its level. 
  There is still relatively little evidence on the 
effects of openness to trade on resource depletion. 
There are a number of case studies that look at 
the effects of trade liberalization on specific re-
sources in specific countries. López (1998) is a 
very interesting study that estimates empirically 
the extent to which villagers internalize external-
ities in their use of common property land in Côte 
d’Ivoire. He finds that the externalities are not 
internalized and estimates the losses in income 
from this to be about 14 percent. Similar results 
are found for Ghana in López (1997). He finds 
that trade liberalization exacerbates environ-
mental problems in Ghana because it encourages 
the expansion of agriculture and exacerbates the 
common property problems. Benhin and Barbier 
(2001) also find that trade liberalization increases 
deforestation in Ghana. However, López (2000) 
finds that trade liberalization is good for the envi-
ronment in Côte d’Ivoire because it has a com-
parative advantage in tree crops, and so this re-
duces pressure from agriculture on the local bio-
mass. 
 
6 See Copeland and Taylor (1997) for a formal treatment of this pos-
sibility. 
7 See Barbier (2004). 
  Several papers use cross-country data on defor-
estation to show that institutions, such as property 
rights, and corruption indexes are an important 
factor in explaining deforestation (see for exam-
ple Deacon 1994, Bohn and Deacon 2000, and 
Barbier and Burgess 2001). Ferreira (2004) is one 
of the few papers to directly test the hypothesis 
that the effects of trade on resource depletion 
depend on the management regime. The author 
uses cross-country data on deforestation as well 
as data on the quality of property rights. She finds 
that openness to trade increases deforestation 
only for those countries with weak property 
rights. 
  A separate literature sometimes known as the 
“resource curse” literature has also provided evi-
dence that property rights regimes are critical in 
determining how markets interact with natural 
resource endowments to affect economic well-
being. In a well-known paper, Sachs and Warner 
(1995) found a negative correlation between the 
importance of resources in a country’s exports 
and its economic performance. This was inter-
preted as evidence that an abundance of natural 
resources may paradoxically be bad for a country. 
However, recent work has suggested that the pol-
icy regime is fundamentally important in deter-
mining whether a large endowment of natural 
resources deters economic growth. Mehlum, 
Moene, and Torvik (2002) develop a simple theo-
retical model in which agents decide whether to 
engage in productive activity or attempt to poach 
resource rents. They find that increases in re-
source endowments lower income in countries 
with poor institutions (because it leads to too 
much increased poaching and rent-seeking behav-
ior). However, in countries with good institutions, 
increases in the resource endowment raise real 
income. In their empirical work, they confirm that 
resource abundance acts as a drag on economic 
growth only via an interaction effect with poor 
institutions. They do not explore the implications 
of openness to trade, but their work provides 
more evidence that the quality of the resource 
management regime is critical in determining 
market outcomes in countries with natural re-
sources. 
  While the evidence is still fairly sketchy, the 
recent empirical work on the importance of insti-
tutional variables is supportive of the view that 
the management regime will be critical in deter-
mining the effects of trade liberalization on a 
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country exporting renewable resources. One weak-
ness of this work, however, is that management 
regimes are treated as exogenous. There is a great 
deal of heterogeneity in the effectiveness of re-
source management both across countries and 
across resource types within countries. One 
would expect this heterogeneity to be endoge-
nous—management regimes are determined by an 
interaction between characteristics of the resource, 
market conditions, national institutions and cul-
ture, and other factors. If this is the case, then one 
might expect that trade could lead to a change in 
the intensity of resource management. 
  Ostrom (1990), Baland and Platteau (1996), 
and others have documented the wide variety of 
ways that rural communities have found to deal 
with common property management. Many of 
these regimes rely on social norms and traditions. 
One concern is that exposure to international 
trade and investment could lead to a collapse of 
these systems. Another possibility is that trade 
and investment could increase the value of the 
resource and consequently increase the incentive 
to set up a viable management regime. As yet, we 
know very little about how trade may play a role 
in transforming management regimes in renew-
able resources. 
  In what follows, I briefly review some of the 
recent work that attempts to endogenize the man-
agement regime in simple general equilibrium 
trade models with renewable resources. 
 
Threshold Models 
Francis (2001), Margolis and Shogren (2002), 
and Bergeron (2002) develop threshold models of 
renewable resource management to analyze the 
effects of trade liberalization. In these models, 
there is a fixed cost of managing the resource, 
and a management system is not set up until the 
potential rents generated by the resource surpass a 
threshold level beyond which the benefits of 
regulation exceed the costs. They build on the en-
dogenous enclosure models of Cohen and Weitz-
man (1975) and De Meza and Gould (1992).
8
 
8 Threshold models have also been used in pollution literature to ex-
plain the environmental Kuznets curve. If environmental quality is a 
normal good, then the benefits of regulating pollution increase in 
income. If there are fixed costs of environmental regulation, then such 
a model predicts that countries will not set up a pollution regulation 
system until they are sufficiently rich. See Copeland and Taylor (2003) 
for an exposition of these models. 
  The model can be illustrated with reference to 
Figure 7. The sustainable steady state harvest is 
H(L), which has a standard inverse-U shape—
sustained high levels of labor allocated to harvest-
ing depletes the stock and so the sustainable har-
vest is decreasing in L for sufficiently high L. The 
opportunity cost of labor measured in terms of the 
harvest good is wL/P, where P is the price of the 
harvest good. Two such lines are drawn, corre-
sponding to two different prices: P0 < P1. 
  Suppose that the country exports the harvest 
good, and that high levels of protection result in a 
relatively low price for the harvest good P0. At 
this point the maximal surplus generated by the 
resource would be given by the distance ab. Let E 
denote the fixed cost of setting up an enforcement 
system (measured in terms of a numeraire good). 
Then if ab < E, it is not cost effective to manage 
the resource, and the open access outcome obtains. 
  Now suppose that trade liberalization raises the 
harvest price to P1.
9 The potential rents from the 
resource are now given by the distance cd. If cd > 
E, then trade liberalization leads to the creation of 
a management regime. 
  This model predicts that a country that starts 
out with an open access management regime may 
make a transition to full resource management as 
the resource becomes more valuable via trade. 
Conversely, if the country imports the resource, a 
pre-existing management regime may collapse as 
the resource becomes less valuable. Francis (2001) 
and Margolis and Shogren (2002) both point out,  
  
 
Figure 7. Threshold Model of Resource 
Management 
                                                                                    
9 This could result either from a reduction in import tariffs in the rest 
of the economy (which would raise the relative domestic price of H), 
or from a reduction in import restrictions on H in the rest of the world. 
 Copeland  Policy Endogeneity and the Effects of Trade on the Environment   11 
 
however, that trade liberalization need not raise 
welfare even when it induces a transition to an ef-
fective management regime. This is because man-
agement is costly. In the absence of management, 
trade would lower welfare for an exporter in these 
models; the introduction of management dampens 
this effect, but need not offset it. However, once 
the management system is set up, further in-
creases in the export price must raise welfare. 
  Another interesting implication of these mod-
els, although not discussed by the authors, is that 
they can shed some light on the issue of sequenc-
ing of trade and resource management reforms. If 
we observe a country with an open access man-
agement regime, then we might want to be cau-
tious about liberalizing trade until an effective 
management regime is set up. But such a regime 
may not be viable until the resource is capable of 
generating a sufficiently large surplus. 
  The authors of all of these papers are interested 
mainly in welfare results, and in particular in 
showing that it is possible that trade may still lead 
to welfare losses even with endogenous transition 
of management regimes. However, for empirical 
purposes, these models allow us to investigate the 
interesting questions of which types of countries 
are likely to make the transition, which types of 
resources within a country will be well managed, 
and which types of countries might experience 
real income losses from trade. One of the implica-
tions of these models is that anything that raises 
surplus increases the likelihood of management 
regime. Higher prices for the harvest good, faster 
growing resource stocks, better harvest technol-
ogy, imports of low-cost intermediate goods used 
in harvesting, etc., will all lead to an increased 
likelihood of an effective management regime 
emerging. Moreover, these models predict that as 
the harvest good price p gets very high, all re-
sources are manageable. 
  These models have some weaknesses. As the 
price of the harvest good rises, we expect more 
pressure on the resource; however, in these mod-
els cost of enforcement is independent of pressure 
on the resource. Other sources of pressure include 
population pressure, and pressure from foreign 
investors, and possibly from foreign harvesters. 
None of these affect enforcement costs in these 
models. Finally, these models focus on the open 
access problem. They are essentially enclosure 
models. Once the enforcement cost is paid, there 
is no difference between the renewable resource 
and any other privately run economic activity. 
There is no common property problem; and to the 
extent that many resources, such as fisheries, 
have at their root a common property problem, 
they go only partway towards providing a theory 





Hotte, Long, and Tian (2000) develop a model 
with variable enforcement costs. They also re-
strict themselves to the open access problem. A 
single agent owns a pool of resources, but must 
spend resources to enforce the property rights. 
The agent sets up a line of defense, and poachers 
must spend a fraction  γ of their time evading 
these defenses. Hence the effective cost of labor 
in poaching is w/(1 – γ). The resource manager 
can choose γ. Higher γ deters poaching, but re-
quires more defenses. Let c(γ) denote the increas-
ing and convex enforcement cost function. 
  The manager’s problem can be illustrated with 
a couple of diagrams. In Figure 8, I have plotted 
the usual steady state sustainable harvest function 
H(L), where L is labor input. The manager’s op-
portunity cost of labor is wL/p. The open access 
outcome (with no enforcement) is at L1, and the 
surplus maximizing point is L*. The opportunity 
cost of labor for poachers is wL/[p(1 – γ)]. Notice 
that this imposes a constraint (a lower bound) on 
the amount of labor the manager can allocate to 
the resource. Poachers will enter and dissipate 
rents as long as their expected profit is positive; 
and this will occur if L < L(γ). Hence the manager 
will always choose to deter poaching by keeping 
L ≥ L(γ). 
 
Figure 8. Poaching Constraint 
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  Finally, the manager chooses γ. This is illus-
trated in Figure 9. As γ rises, poaching is deterred 
more, and profits to the manager (excluding en-
forcement costs), π, rise. For γ sufficiently high, 
the poaching constraint will not bind and the 
manager can maximize sustainable surplus. Fur-
ther increases in γ do not affect profits. Hence the 
profit function π(γ) has the shape illustrated. 
  The manager’s objective is to choose g to 
maximize π(γ) − c(γ). Three different enforcement 
cost functions are illustrated.   If enforcement is 
very costly (as captured by c0), then γ = 0,  and 
the open access outcome prevails. This corre-
sponds to the cases in the fixed-cost models 
where the surplus generated by the resource is not 
enough to cover enforcement costs. For interme-
diate levels of enforcement costs (such as c1), an 
entry deterrence equilibrium is obtained—a man-
agement system is in place, but the manager over-
harvests to deter poaching. Finally, if enforce-
ment is cheap (such as c2), then an outcome very 
close to the first best is obtained. 
  As in the fixed-cost models, an increase in the 
price of the resource via exporting will shift up 
the profit function, and increase the benefits of 
enforcement. Thus trade can lead to a shift in the 
de facto management regime. Hotte, Long, and 
Tian (2000) focus on the welfare aspects of their 
model, and their main result is that trade liberali-
zation may be welfare-decreasing even if it cre-
ates a shift from open access to enforcement of 
property rights. This comes about for two rea-
sons. Without enforcement, trade would reduce 
welfare, as in the Brander-Taylor model. This 
welfare loss from trade can be offset by introduc-
ing an enforcement scheme. But since enforce-
ment is costly, this may not be enough to offset 
the tendency for losses from trade. 
 
 
Figure 9. Choice of Enforcement Level 
  An interesting question for empirical work is 
which types of countries will have good enforce-
ment, and which will have weak enforcement. 
Although Hotte, Long, and Tian (2000) do not 
pursue this, their model would predict hetero-
geneity both across countries and across different 
types of resources within a country. One would 
expect this to vary systematically with parameters 
such as the growth rate of the resource stock, 
population pressure (which affects the supply of 
poachers), etc. Finally, one could use this model 
to ask which types of countries will be expected 
to undergo a transition to better resource manage-
ment when trade liberalizes. 
 
Managing Common Property 
 
The above models all focus on the problem of lim-
iting access of outsiders to a resource and assume 
that a single private manager controls the resource. 
Many resources, however, are managed as com-
mon property resources. This applies to both rich 
and poor countries. Fisheries are often treated as a 
common property resource. A large number of 
agents are allowed access to the resource, and a 
manager attempts to place limits on their harvesting 
effort. Other types of common property resources 
include access to forests for fuel wood, access to 
grazing land, and access to water supplies. 
  Copeland and Taylor (2004b) develop a simple 
general equilibrium trade model of a common 
property renewable resource in which a manager 
attempts to internalize the harvest externality, but 
with imperfect monitoring. Agents are given har-
vest restrictions. If they cheat and over-harvest, 
they are punished by having their rights of access 
to the resource taken away. This yields an incen-
tive constraint which is much like that found in 
efficiency wage models: agents must expect to 
receive some surplus from the resource in order 
for exclusion from the resource to be a costly 
punishment. However, if the surplus is too high, 
agents face an irresistible incentive to cheat, and 
open access obtains. 
  As the resource becomes more valuable (such 
as via export-driven trading opportunities), the 
surplus from the resource rises, thus increasing 
the cost of cheating. But the short-run benefits of 
cheating also rise. Whether or not the former ef-
fect is enough to make the management system 
effective varies across countries. 
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  The model predicts three types of economies. 
Some economies will never be able to satisfy the 
incentive constraint: there is too much pressure 
on the resource for the incentive mechanism to be 
effective. These are economies with slow-grow-
ing resources, impatient agents, very efficient har-
vesting technologies, and large numbers of agents 
with a right of access to the resource. 
  In economies with less pressure on the re-
source, management is not effective at low re-
source prices, but as prices increase, the economy 
can make a transition into effective management. 
In some but not all such economies the incentive 
constraint will not bind at sufficiently high re-
source prices, and the first best will be obtained. 
  It is interesting to note that the predictions of 
this model differ in some respects from the 
threshold model. In threshold models, anything 
that increases surplus from the resource increases 
the likelihood of effective management. How-
ever, in the incentive constraint model of Cope-
land and Taylor (2004b), factors that put in-
creased pressure on the resource can lead to col-
lapse of the management regime—for example, 
improved harvest technology and imports of low-
cost intermediate goods used in harvesting will 
increase the likelihood of effective management 
in the threshold models. However, these factors 
can lead to the collapse of the management re-





This paper has reviewed several different ap-
proaches to modeling endogenous policy in the 
literature on trade and the environment. 
  In the context of pollution, models with en-
dogenous policy have had a major impact on both 
the theoretical and empirical literature. The earlier 
consensus that environmental policy does not 
affect trade and investment flows as surveyed by 
Jaffe et al. (1995) has been undermined mainly 
because of a recognition of the importance of 
endogenous policy differences. 
  There are still many opportunities for more 
research in this area in the context of pollution. 
Most of the empirical work uses U.S. data, and as 
data from other countries becomes available, 
more work focusing on the role of endogenous 
differences in policy across countries in affecting 
trade flows will be possible. As well, early em-
pirical work on the political economy of trade and 
environmental policy suggests some conflicting 
results, and so there is much scope for more in-
vestigation. 
  Work on the effect of trade on renewable re-
sources with endogenous management systems is 
still in its very early stages. Early work in this 
area is beginning to yield some clear testable hy-
potheses about how measurable differences 
across countries and resource stocks might affect 
both management and trade outcomes. Hopefully, 
this paper will help to stimulate an empirical in-




Antweiler, W., B.R. Copeland, and M.S. Taylor. 2001. “Is 
Free Trade Good for the Environment?” American Eco-
nomic Review 91(4): 877–908. 
Baland, J.M., and J.P. Platteau. 1996. Halting Degradation of 
Natural Resources: Is There a Role for Rural Communi-
ties? Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press. 
Barbier, E.B. 2004. “Natural Capital, Resource Dependency, 
and Poverty in Developing Countries: The Problem of Du-
alism within Dualism.” Initiative for Policy Dialogue work-
ing paper, Columbia University. 
Barbier, E.B., and J.C. Burgess. 2001. “The Economics of 
Tropical Deforestation.” Journal of Economic Surveys 
15(3): 413–433. 
Becker, R., and V. Henderson. 2000. “Effects of Air Quality 
Regulations on Polluting Industries.” Journal of Political 
Economy 108(2): 379–421. 
Benhin, J., and E.B. Barbier. 2001. “The Effects of the Struc-
tural Adjustment Program on Deforestation in Ghana.” Ag-
ricultural and Resource Economics Review 30(1): 66–80. 
Bergeron, N. 2002. “International Trade and Conservation 
with Costly Natural Resource Management.” Research 
Group in Energy, Environmental and Natural Resource 
Economics (GREEN) Working Paper No. 0204, Laval Uni-
versity, Québec. 
Bohn, H., and R.T. Deacon. 2000. “Ownership Risk, Invest-
ment, and the Use of Natural Resources.” The American 
Economic Review 90(3): 526–549. 
Bommer, R., and G.G. Schulze. 1999. “Environmental Im-
provement with Trade Liberalization.” European Journal of 
Political Economy 15(4): 639–661. 
Brander, J., and M. Taylor. 1997. “International Trade and 
Open Access Renewable Resources: The Small Open 
Economy Case.” Canadian Journal of Economics 30(3): 
526–552. 
Chichilnisky, G. 1994. “North-South Trade and the Global 
Environment.”  American Economic Review 84(4): 851–
874. 
Cohen, J.S., and M.L. Weitzman. 1975. “A Marxian Model of 
 14   April 2005  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
Enclosures.”  Journal of Development Economics 1(4): 
287–336. 
Copeland, B.R., and M.S. Taylor. 1994. “North-South Trade 
and the Environment.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 
109(3): 755–787. 
____. 1995. “Trade and Transboundary Pollution.” American 
Economic Review 85(4): 716–737. 
____. 1997. “The Trade-Induced Degradation Hypothesis.” 
Resource and Energy Economics 19(4): 321–344. 
____. 2003. Trade and the Environment: Theory and Evi-
dence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
____. 2004a. “Trade, Growth and The Environment.” Journal 
of Economic Literature 42(1): 7–71. 
____. 2004b. “Trade, Tragedy and the Commons.” NBER 
Working Paper No. 10836, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Cambridge, MA. 
____. Forthcoming. “Free Trade and Global Warming: A 
Trade Theory View of the Kyoto Protocol.” Journal of En-
vironmental Economics and Management. 
Daly, H. 1993. “The Perils of Free Trade.” Scientific American 
269(5): 50–57. 
Damania , R., P. Fredriksson, and J. List. 2003. “Trade Liber-
alization, Corruption, and Environmental Policy Formation: 
Theory and Evidence.” Journal of Environmental Econom-
ics and Management 46(3): 490–512. 
Dasgupta, S., A. Mody, S. Roy, and D. Wheeler. 1995. “Envi-
ronmental Regulation and Development: A Cross-Country 
Empirical Analysis.” Policy Research Department Working 
Paper No. 1448 (April), World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
Deacon, R.T. 1994. “Deforestation and the Rule of Law in a 
Cross-Section of Countries.” Land Economics 70(4): 414–
430. 
De Meza, D., and J. Gould. 1992. “The Social Efficiency of 
Private Decisions to Enforce Property Rights.” Journal of 
Political Economy 100(3): 561–580. 
Ederington, W.J., and J. Minier. 2003. “Is Environmental 
Policy a Secondary Trade Barrier? An Empirical Analysis.” 
Canadian Journal of Economics 36(1): 137–154. 
Eliste, P., and P.G. Fredriksson. 2002. “Environmental Regu-
lations, Transfers and Trade: Theory and Evidence.” Jour-
nal of Environmental Economics and Management 43(2): 
234–250. 
Ferreira S. 2004. “Deforestation, Property Rights, and Interna-
tional Trade.” Land Economics 80(2): 174–193. 
Francis, M. 2001. “Trade and the Adoption of Environmental 
Standards.” Working paper (July), School of Economics 
and Marketing, University of Canberra. 
Greenstone, M. 2002. “The Impacts of Environmental Regula-
tions on Industrial Activity: Evidence from the 1970 and 
the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments and the Census of 
Manufactures.”  Journal of Political Economy 110(6): 
1175–1219. 
Grossman, G.M., and E. Helpman. 1994. “Protection for Sale.” 
American Economic Review 84(4): 833–850. 
Hilton, H., and A. Levinson. 1998. “Factoring the Environ-
mental Kuznets Curve: Evidence from Automotive Lead 
Emissions.”  Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 35(2): 126–141. 
Hokby, S., and T. Soderqvist. 2003. “Elasticities of Demand 
and Willingness to Pay for Environmental Services in Swe-
den.” Environmental and Resource Economics 26(3): 361–
383. 
Hotte L., N.V. Long, and H. Tian. 2000. “International Trade 
with Endogenous Enforcement of Property Rights.” Jour-
nal of Development Economics 62(1): 25–54. 
Jaffe, A., S. Peterson, P. Portney, and R. Stavins. 1995. “Envi-
ronmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of U.S. 
Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?” Journal 
of Economic Literature 33(1): 132–163. 
Keller, W., and A. Levinson. 2002. “Pollution Abatement 
Costs and Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to U.S. 
States.”  Review of Economics and Statistics 84(4): 691–
703. 
Kriström, B., and P. Riera. 1996. “Is the Income Elasticity of 
Environmental Improvements Less Than One?” Environ-
mental and Resource Economics 7(1): 45–55. 
Levinson, A. 1999. “State Taxes and Interstate Hazardous 
Waste Shipments.” American Economic Review 89(3): 
666–677. 
Levinson, A., and S. Taylor. 2004. “Trade and the Environ-
ment: Unmasking the Pollution Haven Effect.” National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper No. 
10629, Cambridge, MA. 
List, J.A., W.W. McHone, D.L. Millimet, and P.G. Fredriks-
son. 2003. “Effects of Environmental Regulations on 
Manufacturing Plant Births: Evidence from a Propensity 
Score Matching Estimator.” Review of Economics and Sta-
tistics 85(4): 944–952. 
López, R. 1997. “Environmental Externalities in Traditional 
Agriculture and the Impact of Trade Liberalization: The 
Case of Ghana.” Journal of Development Economics 53(1): 
17–39.  
____. 1998. “Agricultural Intensification, Common Property 
Resources and the Farm-Household.” Environmental and 
Resource Economics 11(3-4): 443–458. 
____. 2000. “Trade Reform and Environmental Externalities 
in General Equilibrium: Analysis for an Archetype Poor 
Tropical Country.” Environment and Development Eco-
nomics 5(4): 377–404. 
Margolis, M., and J. Shogren. 2002. “Unprotected Resources 
and Voracious World Markets.” Discussion Paper No. 02–
30 (June), Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C. 
Mehlum, H., K. Moene, and R. Torvik. 2002. “Institutions and 
the Resource Curse.” Mimeo, Department of Economics, 
University of Oslo. 
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of 
Institutions for Collective Action. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Pargal, S., and D. Wheeler. 1996. “Informal Regulation of 
Industrial Pollution in Developing Countries: Evidence 
from Indonesia.” Journal of Political Economy 104(6): 
1314–1327. 
Pethig, R. 1976. “Pollution, Welfare and Environmental Pol-
icy in the Theory of Comparative Advantage.” Journal of 
 Copeland  Policy Endogeneity and the Effects of Trade on the Environment   15 
 
Environmental Economics and Management 2(3): 160–169. 
Sachs, J.D., and A.M. Warner. 1995. “Natural Resource 
Abundance and Economic Growth.” National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper No. 5398, 
Cambridge, MA. 
Schleich, J. 1999. “Environmental Quality with Endogenous 
Domestic Trade Policies.” European Journal of Political 
Economy 15(1): 53–71. 
 
 